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THE LAW OF EMERGING ADULTS 
CLARE RYAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Law tends to divide people into two groups based on age: children and 
adults. The age of majority provides a bright line between two quite 
different legal regimes. Minority is characterized by dependency, parental 
control, incapacity, and diminished responsibility. Adulthood is 
characterized by autonomy, capacity, and financial and legal responsibility. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, evolving understandings of 
adolescence in law and culture produced a staged process of increasing 
liberty and responsibility up to the age of majority. After eighteen, however, 
the presumption of adulthood remains strong.  
Today, a combination of psychological and social factors has extended 
the process of becoming an adult well into legal adulthood. Psychologists 
call this life phase “emerging adulthood” and have identified it as a crucial 
period of transition and exploration. This Article argues that emerging 
adults should be treated as a distinct legal category. This life stage differs 
both from childhood and adulthood with regard to three key relationships: 
the parent-child; the individual and the market; and the individual and the 
state.  
Laws are beginning to treat emerging adults differently. This Article 
examines the developing law of emerging adults, by focusing on parental 
support obligations, federal interventions, and punishment. Looking to the 
future, this Article then provides a framework for further legal reform that 
is guided by three principles, which reflect emerging adulthood’s unique 
economic vulnerability, developing autonomy, and capacity to learn from 
mistakes. I argue that a broad array of legal tools could provide individuals 
with greater autonomy than exists during minority, but greater protection 
than adulthood typically provides. Such tools include staging 
responsibilities and entitlements over time, requiring licensing or 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the Parkland, Florida mass killing in February of 
2018, two visions of young people came into focus.1  The first was the 
extraordinary resilience and savvy of the students at Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School who shaped the national conversation around gun 
control reform. Using their facility with social media, these students 
galvanized a movement.2 Many commentators pointed to the students’ age 
as a defining feature in their style of advocacy.3 Some supporters suggested 
that the voting age should be lowered to sixteen, since many of these 
students could not vote against the laws that make guns so ubiquitous in 
American society.4 At the same time, one of the frequently proposed gun 
 
1. Michelle Cottle, How Parkland Students Changed the Gun Debate, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/parkland-students-power/554399/ [https:// 
perma.cc/BKX2-4JYB].  
2. Id. 
3. See Emily Witt, How the Survivors of Parkland Began the Never Again Movement, NEW 
YORKER (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-survivors-of-parkland 
-began-the-never-again-movement [https://perma.cc/25RT-KL87].  
4. John Nichols, Lower the Voting Age to 16, NATION (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.thenation.co 
m/article/lower-the-voting-age-to-16/ [https://perma.cc/C86S-FMGW] (proposing lowering the voting 
age to 16 in response to Parkland and listing jurisdictions where the voting age is younger than eighteen); 
Douglas Ernst, Harvard Law Professor Wants ‘Children’s Crusade’ for Gun Control, Lower Voting 











reforms was to raise the age of gun sales to twenty-one.5 After all, Nikolas 
Cruz was nineteen when he committed the horrific assault on the school.6 
Recent developments in psychology and neuroscience suggest that people 
in their late teens to early twenties are more subject to dangerous and risky 
behavior and to loss of impulse control than are older adults.7 The Parkland 
story provides an extreme illustration of the competing aspects of the time 
between childhood and adulthood. Yet, this transitional and often 
contradictory period of independence/dependence and capacity/incapacity 
plays out in numerous quotidian contexts.  
This Article explores a life stage that until recently has been neglected in 
legal scholarship, despite its increasing salience in psychology and 
culture—emerging adulthood. Emerging adulthood, a term first coined by 
psychologists in the early 2000s, refers to the transitional period between 
approximately ages eighteen and twenty-five. 8  In twenty-first century 
America, emerging adults play a distinct role in society, one characterized 
by shifting expectations around work, responsibility, family, and 
education.9  
Law lags behind this cultural shift. Since the 1970s, most US 
jurisdictions have set the age of majority at eighteen, which divides the law 
for children and for adults into a sharp binary. Throughout the twentieth 
century, exceptions to this binary focused on special rules for adolescents 
who, although legal minors, possessed the capacity and responsibility to be 
treated like adults for some purposes. Deviations upward from age of 
 
Age, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb/19/laurence-h-tr 
ibe-harvard-law-prof-wants-childrens-/ [https://perma.cc/E5QY-YYBY] (reporting on a tweet from 
Professor Larry Tribe advocating for lowering the voting age in response to the #NeverAgain movement 
after Parkland).  
5. President Trump endorsed the policy of raising the age on the sale of certain weapons to 
twenty-one as part of the response to the Parkland shootings. See Catherine Lucey & Matthew Daly, 
Trump Endorses Raising Minimum Age to 21 for More Weapons, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 22, 2018, 9:49 
AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-endorsees-raising-minimum-age-to-21-for-more-w 
eapons [https://perma.cc/KNZ6-HFXY]; see also YOUGOV, THE ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL 101 (July 
29–31, 2019), https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/fw0vfdqfpc/econTab 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CP-RXBQ] (finding that 65 percent of adults polled approved of raising 
the minimum gun purchasing age to twenty-one).  
6. Patricia Mazzei, Parkland Shooting Suspect Lost Special-Needs Help at School When He 
Needed It Most, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/us/parkland-florida-
nikolas-cruz.html [https://perma.cc/Z62F-MHJ8] (discussing how Cruz’s age and legal adulthood put 
him in a liminal space, in which he lost help from his school and was able to legally purchase guns).  
7. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie & Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood as a 
Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 
645–46 (2016) (describing the risk-taking behavior of emerging adults). 
8. In 2000, psychologist Jeffrey Jensen Arnett coined the term “emerging adulthood” (“EA”) 
to describe the period between eighteen to twenty-five years old. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging 
Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
469 (2000). Arnett suggested that a range of economic, psychological, and cultural factors made this age 
group developmentally distinct from older adults.  












majority—notably the drinking age set at twenty-one—were the rare 
exception.10  
In recent years, however, a patchwork of laws has sprung up at both the 
state and federal level, which treats emerging adults differently. Some 
examples include: young people cannot open credit cards without a co-
signor until they turn twenty-one,11 the Affordable Care Act permits adult 
children to stay on their parents’ health insurance until twenty-six,12 and a 
range of state laws extend parental support obligations past the age of 
majority.13  
Although gaining in number and importance, new emerging adult laws 
are under-studied, especially outside of the criminal law realm.14 A small 
group of legal scholars, however, has begun developing a literature on law 
and emerging adults. Much of this work focuses on a single issue (such as 
contract capacity) or a specific area of law (such as criminal law) to examine 
how law might be better calibrated to current notions of maturity.15 This 
Article engages with this conversation to provide a trans-substantive 
perspective.16  
To that end, I propose a set of principles to guide legal reform. New laws 
of emerging adulthood should be responsive to this age group’s economic 
vulnerability, need for autonomy, and capacity to learn from mistakes. This 
Article unpacks these three concepts and shows how they drive both 
substance—what the law of emerging adults should cover—and form—the 
processes by which law can accomplish these aims.  
 
10. See infra Part IV.A. 
11. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 
123 Stat. 1734. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–14(a) (2018) (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering 
group or individual health insurance coverage that provides dependent coverage of children shall 
continue to make such coverage available for an adult child until the child turns 26 years of age. Nothing 
in this section shall require a health plan or a health insurance issuer described in the preceding sentence 
to make coverage available for a child of a child receiving dependent coverage.”). 
13. See infra Part II.A (compiling support laws).  
14. The criminal law arena has probably seen the richest discussion of how age interacts with 
punishment and culpability. See Kevin Lapp, Young Adults & Criminal Jurisdiction, 56 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 357 (2019); Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for 
Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769 (2016); Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of 
Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2016). For other literature addressing specific areas of law, 
see, for example, Wayne R. Barnes, Arrested Development: Rethinking the Contract Age of Majority for 
the Twenty-First Century Adolescent, 76 MD. L. REV. 405 (2017), and Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and 
Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 
TEMP. L. REV. 557 (2006). 
15. See infra Part III.B. 
16. In that respect, this Article seeks to build upon and respond to a handful of scholars whose 
treatment of emerging adulthood cuts across legal categories. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law 
and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55 (2016); Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 
BYU L. REV. 1055, 1057; Scott, Bonnie & Steinberg, supra note 7; Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1107 (2012). 











This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the backdrop against 
which the law of emerging adults plays out. I identify the key social, 
psychological, and biological forces that make emerging adulthood distinct 
from childhood and full adulthood. By emphasizing how relationships 
within the family, toward the larger community, and vis-à-vis the state shift 
over the period of late adolescence and into adulthood, this Part 
demonstrates why the traditional binary of dependent children and 
autonomous, responsible adults is ill-suited to emerging adulthood.  
Part II analyzes three contexts in which the law of emerging adults is 
already changing: parental obligations, federal intervention, and 
punishment. Each of these areas provides different insights into the 
challenges of treating emerging adults differently, including the risk of 
extending parental control over adult children, the unequal opportunities 
available to emerging adults depending on socioeconomic status, the role of 
higher education, and the delicate balance between protection and 
accountability. Through these examples I also engage with questions of 
institutional role. State and federal lawmakers, as well as courts and 
legislatures, participate in the construction of emerging adult laws and each 
provide different institutional capacities and drawbacks.  
Part III then advances a set of guiding principles for both the form and 
substance of legal change. These principles focus on the unique 
vulnerabilities and capacities of emerging adulthood, namely economic 
dependence, developing autonomy, and learning from mistakes. This Part 
proposes what a new law of emerging adults should include, both in the 
substance of laws—such as expanding opportunities for higher education 
and mitigating the consequences of bad decisions—and in the form such 
laws should take—including staged responsibilities, conditional rights, and 
supported decision-making.  
Part IV looks to the future: how might a new law of emerging adults be 
realized? Drawing lessons from historical instances of widespread 
transformation in age laws, and in light of contemporary events, I argue that 
conditions are ripe for change. This Part concludes by addressing not only 
the potential for change, but also the obstacles in its path.  
I. FROM CHILD TO ADULT 
A. Social and Developmental Factors 
In order to determine whether emerging adulthood warrants its own legal 
category, one must first understand what makes the emerging adult 
experience unique. There are approximately thirty-five million eighteen-to-












percent of the total population.17 This section presents the evidence that 
their mental and emotional capacities, as well as their role in society, are 
distinct from that of children and older adults.  
Contrasting emerging adulthood with the developmental features of 
adolescence, Jeffery Jensen Arnett, the psychologist who first defined 
“emerging adulthood,” explains:  
Emerging adults have become more independent of their parents than 
they were as adolescents and most of them have left home, but they 
have not yet entered the stable, enduring commitments typical of 
adult life, such as a long-term job, marriage, and parenthood. During 
this interval of years when they are neither beholden to their parents 
nor committed to an assortment of adult roles, they have an 
exceptional opportunity to try out different ways of living and 
different possible choices for love and work.18  
In her work on marital age, June Carbone observed that in recent years, 
when asked what constitutes adulthood, many young people reject 
chronological age or traditional markers like marriage and parenthood in 
favor of factors such as “accepting responsibility for oneself, making 
independent decisions, and becoming financially independent.”19 In popular 
culture, the phrase “twenty-five is the new eighteen”20 suggests that where 
their parents and grandparents were full adults by their early twenties, young 
people today are still in the process of growing up.21 
The cultural phenomenon of emerging adulthood has many features that 
seem to be reserved for middle class and wealthy families. These young 
people are more reliant on parental support, they stay in school longer, get 
married and have children later, and generally remain in a liminal pre-adult 
 
17. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Single Year of Age and Sex for the United 
States 2018 Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservi 
ces/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk# (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (final numbers determined by 
adding the total population estimates for ages eighteen to twenty-five and comparing that to the total 
population estimate). 
18. JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE 
TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES 9 (2d ed. 2015).  
19. June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 901, 905 (2008). 
20. Bret Stetka, Extended Adolescence: When 25 Is the New 18, SCI. AM. (Sept. 19, 2017), https:/ 
/www.scientificamerican.com/article/extended-adolescence-when-25-is-the-new-181/ [https://perma.cc 
/J5QY-G2W9] (commenting on cultural shifts among young people including greater reliance on parents 
and a reduction in behavior like alcohol use and sexual activity). 
21. For a study comparing twenty-one-to-thirty-six-year-olds today to their grandparents’ 
generation, see Richard Fry et al., How Millennials Today Compare with Their Grandparents 50 Years 
Ago, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/16/how-millennial 
s-compare-with-their-grandparents/ [https://perma.cc/3HMY-4AF2] (observing, among other things, 
that emerging adults today are more detached from major institutions such as marriage, religion, the 
military, and political parties).  











space for much longer.22 Carbone’s work, for instance, draws from  research 
showing that for the upper quartile of women, maternal age at the birth of 
the first child rose from twenty-six to thirty-two by 2000, a fact that Carbone 
links to a larger phenomenon in which for “the college educated portion of 
the population, non-marital birth rates are below 10%, divorce rates have 
fallen back to the levels of the sixties, paternal involvement in childrearing 
has doubled, and maternal workforce participation has become the norm.”23 
Marriage and parenthood, for this section of the population, occurs only 
after the “supervised and subsidized pathway to adulthood.” 24  She 
concludes, therefore, that this middle and upper class model of adulthood: 
doubly disadvantages the poor. They disproportionately lack access 
to the new, approved pathways to adulthood that postpone 
childrearing, and include post-secondary education, subsidized 
internships, contraception, and (if necessary) abortion. At the same 
time, the societal structure and support that guided more traditional 
family formation (e.g., high school romances and unintended 
pregnancies that lead to early marriage) have atrophied.25 
An image of young people enjoying an extended period of exploration 
and dependence only tells a part of the story. Factors like socioeconomic 
status, race, gender, sexual orientation, physical and mental health, as well 
as the specifics of a family dynamic or individual personality, produce quite 
different opportunities and options by the time a young person turns 
eighteen. 26  Some emerging adults remain deeply embedded in their 
childhood households and roles, while others are themselves parents of 
young children. Different communities within the United States mark the 
passage to adulthood through a range of rituals and social expectations;27 
 
22. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Kathryn Barber, Domicile Dismantled, 92 IND. L.J. 387, 410 
(2017) (describing emerging adults returning home after college or relying on parental support for low-
paying, but high reward career choices).  
23. Carbone, supra note 19, at 902. 
24. Id. at 903. 
25. Id. (footnote omitted). 
26. The psychological studies that gave rise to the notion of emerging adulthood are subject to a 
common critique, that they focus on samples that are “WEIRD” or “western, educated, industrialized, 
rich, and democratic.” Although recently researchers have endeavored to move beyond relying on 
American college students as samples, this critique does raise a valid question about how generalizable 
the concept of “emerging adulthood” actually is. For that reason, I seek to show how the benefits of a 
longer developmental period of exploration and education might be extended to larger numbers of 
American young people, but I do not contend that every person who is chronologically eighteen to 
twenty-five experiences the conditions of emerging adulthood described in the literature. For more on 
the WEIRD problem in psychology research, see B. Azar, Are Your Findings ‘WEIRD’?, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N (May 2010), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird.aspx [https://perma.cc/S7SV-WTRK].  
27. See, e.g., Stuart Schoenfeld, Age and Identity, in AGE IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL ERA TO 












expectations around the parent-child relationship vary across class and 
culture, as do plans for postsecondary education.  
Nevertheless, there are aspects of emerging adulthood shared by those 
who fit into this chronological age, even if their lived experiences diverge. 
This section seeks to present some broad trends that cut across different 
identities, while remaining conscious of the ways in which these social and 
economic changes have vastly different repercussions for emerging adults 
with a diverse range of experiences. A complex set of factors combine to 
produce the emerging adult experience. Some of these are legal and social 
conditions, while others are psychological and developmental. The term 
“emerging adulthood,” at least as I use it, refers neither to a purely 
psychological stage nor a cultural phenomenon, but a combination of the 
two. It is both that emerging adults share certain developmental features and 
that the economic and social conditions of twenty-first century America 
tend to affect emerging adults differently from other age groups.  
One central feature of emerging adulthood is the role of education, which 
permeates the emerging adult experience. Current population survey data 
suggest that approximately 74 percent of eighteen-year-olds, about 60 
percent of twenty-year-olds, and 23 percent of twenty-four-year-olds were 
enrolled in high school or higher education.28 Many of these are young 
people completing high school diplomas, but the percentage of emerging 
adults who are enrolled in some form of higher education is significant.29  
Universities occupy a special place in the twenty-first century emerging 
adult’s life, both for those who are enrolled in higher education and those 
who are not. For some, college can be a testing ground for adulthood, often 
offering a more protective and supportive environment than one would find 
in the “real world.” For others, access to higher education poses one of the 
most significant barriers to social mobility in our society.30 The prohibitive 
cost of higher education, as well as the fundamentally unequal preparation 
that young people receive in the college application process, serves as a 
crucial gate to professional success.31 It also acts as a powerful social sorter, 
 
American Jewish community); Todres, supra note 16, at 1160 (emphasizing the importance of coming-
of-age ceremonies).  
28. School Enrollment in the United States: October 2017—Detailed Tables, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/school-enrollment/2017-
cps.html (follow “TABLE 1: All Races” hyperlink). These numbers include only the non-
institutionalized civilian population.  
29. Id. (classifying the age groups by level of education).  
30. See Rachel F. Moran, City on a Hill: The Democratic Promise of Higher Education, 7 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 73 (2017).  
31. For a detailed report on the most recent data on college cost, number of students who attend 
higher education and what types of institutions they attend, see PELL INST. FOR THE STUDY OF 
OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUC., INDICATORS OF HIGHER EDUCATION EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2019), http://pellinstitute.org/indicators/ [https://perma.cc/RVJ7-BD2M]. 











as people tend to befriend and marry people with their same level of 
educational attainment.32  
Higher education is not only important because large numbers of young 
people are enrolled in some form of post-secondary schooling, but also 
because of the economic and social stratification of the United States based 
on educational attainment. For example, the mean earnings (for all ages 
after twenty-five) for individuals with bachelor’s degrees in 2017 were 
$70,668, compared to $40,851 for someone with a high school diploma. 
Add professional degrees to the list and the mean earnings jump to 
$140,106. 33  In 2018, the average weekly salary for a person with a 
bachelor’s degree was $1,286, compared to $713 for those with a high 
school diploma.34 This means that the opportunities young people have in 
their twenties may well shape their life course.35  
Another crucial pivot point for emerging adults is their sense of self in 
relation to others. Some developmental psychologists who study emerging 
adults emphasize the changing nature of relationships. According to this 
view of emerging adulthood: “[R]ecentering is the critical and dynamic shift 
between individual and society that takes place across emerging adulthood 
during which other-regulated behavior . . . is replaced with self-regulated 
behavior toward the goal of . . . the ability to meet the demands of 
adulthood.”36 
Neuroscientists have also identified changes in brain development that 
extend far later into life than previously thought. In the last decade, 
neuroscience research has revealed that the human brain continues to 
develop well into the twenties.37 This development is linked to features like 
decision-making, risk assessment, and emotional regulation.38  
The connection between social science data on emerging adults and legal 
scholarship remains thin, but a handful of significant collaborations between 
 
32. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Quoctrung Bui, Equality in Marriages Grows, and So Does 
Class Divide, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/upshot/rise-in-marriag 
es-of-equals-and-in-division-by-class.html [https://perma.cc/ET2A-FJ8H].  
33. News Release, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers, BUREAU LAB. STAT. 
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf.  
34. Id. 
35. The term “21st Century Skills” refers to a global curriculum that focuses on capacities like 
communication, teamwork, creativity, and leadership that lead to financial success. These skills are often 
the type emphasized in higher education. See 21ST CENTURY SKILLS: RETHINKING HOW STUDENTS 
LEARN (James Bellanca & Ron Brandt eds., 2010).  
36. Jennifer Lynn Tanner, Recentering During Emerging Adulthood, in EMERGING ADULTS IN 
AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 21, 22 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner 
eds., 2006).  
37. For a review of the state of brain development research for adolescents and young adults, see 
Elizabeth Scott et al., Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
13 (2018). 
38. See EVELINE A. CRONE, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: CHANGES IN LEARNING, DECISION-












legal and medical scholars have occurred.39  Recent work highlights the 
potential of using this research to justify a different approach to emerging 
adults in the criminal justice system, arguing that “a categorical assumption 
that eighteen-year-olds conform to the conventional expectations of adults 
in their maturity, competence, and independence sometimes can undermine 
social welfare.”40 This scholarship, however, also cautions against the risk 
of overreliance on social science data that can be misunderstood or distorted 
in a legal context.41  
Taking heed of the concerns articulated by legal and medical researchers, 
this Article does not take the position that the law of emerging adults should 
be based on individualized assessments of mental capacity. Rather, the 
purpose of this information is to underscore that law’s assumptions about 
adulthood are based on beliefs about human development that seem less and 
less to accord with our social and scientific views. That should suggest, at a 
minimum, that the value of these threshold ages as a marker for maturity is 
weak. It also suggests that reforms predicated on forcing young people to 
grow up faster or embrace their full adult responsibility might not work, or 
at least might not be consistent with contemporary understandings of human 
development. 42 
The combination of social and developmental forces paints the picture 
of a transitional age, where education and relationships are central features, 
and in which a person’s full capacities have not yet crystallized. So, if you 
ask a twenty-year-old living in the United States today whether she is an 
adult, her answer might be “not yet,” or, “not all the time.”43 And if you 
were to ask her parents whether they still feel responsible for her, financially 
or emotionally, the answer might easily be “yes.”44 But the law, with some 
notable exceptions, holds the exact opposite. The twenty-year-old is an 
 
39. See Scott et al., supra note 37.  
40. Scott, Bonnie & Steinberg, supra note 7, at 658. 
41. Id. at 643.  
42. See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development 
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009). 
43. ARNETT, supra note 18, at 14–15 (compiling interviews with eighteen-to-twenty-five-year-
olds); see also Julie Beck, When Are You Really an Adult?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.theatla 
ntic.com/health/archive/2016/01/when-are-you-really-an-adult/422487/ [https://perma.cc/XRE6-292L] 
(collecting anecdotal accounts of what it means to be an adult in twenty-first century America, while 
contrasting these accounts with historical notions of adulthood).  
44. Although the numbers vary in different polls and studies, many sources suggest that more 
than half of American parents may be contributing financially to an adult child. See, e.g., Family Support 
in Graying Societies, PEW RES. CTR. (May 21, 2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/21/5-hel 
ping-adult-children/ [https://perma.cc/4WY7-6T7K] (reporting that in 2015, 61 percent of parents with 
adult children reported providing financial support to their child within the last year); D’vera Cohn & 
Jeffrey S. Passel, A Record 64 Million Americans Live in Multigenerational Households, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 5, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans-live-
in-multigenerational-households/ [https://perma.cc/PXH3-Z23V] (noting that in 2016, 20 percent of the 
U.S, population lived in households with two or more adult generations). 











adult, and her parents have no legal responsibility toward her, but neither 
do they have any legal authority to dictate her choices.  
B. Childhood and Adulthood in Law 
This section examines the traditional binary between childhood and 
adulthood in law. With the experience of emerging adults as a backdrop, I 
argue that this binary, which contrasts incapacity and dependence for 
children with autonomy and responsibility for adults, is a poor fit for the 
way that people reach adulthood today. To illustrate the divide between law 
and lived experience, I break down the component parts of how age law 
constructs the categories of child and adult.  
Age laws define three types of relationships: family, state, and 
community/market. For children, these three relationships are grounded in 
expectations of protection, care, and control. By contrast, adult engagement 
with the world is governed by rules that prioritize autonomy and equality. 
That is not to say that children lack all autonomous rights or that adults 
operate entirely independent of paternalist rules, but rather to highlight the 
categorical extremes. The following table illustrates how these relationships 
change with age. The rows represent life stages, the columns are the settings 
in which children and adults have different legal roles. The boxes report the 
attributes of the relationship as it varies by age.  
 
 Parent-Child Individual-3rd 
Party 
Citizen-State 




Adulthood Independence Equal Actors Responsible 
Citizen 
 
In childhood, the model of parental custody and control, coupled with 
financial obligations toward the child, predominates.45 As the U.S. Supreme 
Court proclaimed in Troxel v. Granville, “[t]he liberty interest . . . of parents 
in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 46  Custodial 
parents have the right to choose their child’s educational and religious 
 
45. For a comprehensive analysis, grounded in the Third Restatement on Children and the Law, 
see Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First 
Century, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3448689.  












experiences, approve who can spend time with the child, choose where the 
child lives, choose whether the child can work, and determine what happens 
to the child’s wages, among other crucial life decisions.47  In exchange, 
children are entitled to care and support from their parents.48  
Where minors are concerned, the state serves as parens patriae, a default 
custodian in the event that parents are unable or deemed unsuitable to care 
for the child. 49  In practice, the state can often be a punitive force in 
children’s lives, as critiques of the juvenile justice system make clear.50 As 
a matter of legal theory, however, the state’s primary function is 
protective.51 This paternalist state can also infringe on children’s liberty in 
a manner that would be unconstitutional for adults, such as when it permits 
schools to restrict speech.52  
A child’s rights and responsibilities in relation to third parties are 
mediated through the parent or guardian. Custodial parents have the 
authority to decide who can interact with their children, where the child goes 
to school, and to which communities she belongs.53 As a recent critique of 
parental control model observes: “Far from being left alone to make their 
 
47. See Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 
1454–55 (2018) (describing the constitutional framework of parental rights).  
48. See Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental 
Obligation, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 41 (1998). 
49. See, e.g., Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child 
Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 51–52 (2007) (“Government’s parens patriae power—
a species of paternalism—derives from the ancient prerogative of the British Crown to act as the 
guardian of persons such as children and the mentally disabled who were ‘legally unable, on account of 
mental incapacity . . . to take proper care of themselves and their property.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982))) (noting, also, the expansion 
of parens patriae powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to include child protection, juvenile 
justice, and compulsory education statutes). 
50. See Barry C. Feld, Punishing Kids in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 47 CRIME & JUST. 417, 
418–19 (2018) (“Contemporary juvenile justice policies reflect the harsh legacy of the 1980s and 1990s 
. . . . Get-tough policies include extensive pretrial detention, punitive delinquency sanctions, increased 
transfer to criminal courts, and severe sentences as adults, all rife with racial disparities.”). For reports 
on minors held in solitary confinement, see THE ARTHUR LIMAN PUB. INTEREST PROGRAM, AIMING TO 
REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL 42–46 (Nov. 2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/docu 
ment/aimingtoreducetic.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY9X-C2TU] (reporting on individuals under eighteen 
held in restricted housing).  
51. See Huntington & Scott, supra note 45, at 2 (describing the state’s role in protecting children 
through what they term the “Child Wellbeing” framework).  
52. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (noting that a student’s First 
Amendment rights in public school are not coextensive with an adult’s rights). A recent review of 
constitutional law relating to children concluded that  
[c]haracterizations of children’s vulnerability to physical or psychological harm play an 
essential jurisprudential role in justifying or restricting state action that may limit or expand the 
constitutional rights of others, such as parents, guardians, or the children themselves. At the 
heart of state authority to regulate children are its parens patriae and police power interests.  
Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 
233 (2017). 
53. However, they may not actually be able to enforce this power as a practical matter. 











own choices, children are directed by their parents and the state into 
relationships, activities, educational instruction, and ways of life not of their 
own choosing.”54  
Although young people are an important consumer force, their economic 
power is filtered through their parents’ power over any wages the child 
receives, as well as by the infancy doctrine under which contracts made with 
minors are voidable.55 Although children may wield significant wealth from 
within the protection of the family unit, minors have little independent 
economic power. Furthermore, children are prohibited from engaging in 
certain market activities—such as purchasing cigarettes, lottery tickets, 
pornography, guns, and alcohol—that are available to adults.  
The law of adulthood provides the mirror image in each realm. The 
relationship between parents and their adult children stands in stark contrast 
to rules governing minor children. Unless the adult is deemed incompetent, 
put under guardianship, or subject to a statutory support rule, an adult’s 
parents have no legal obligations toward her.56 Under the current system, 
the age of majority severs this legal bond between parent and child.57 
In theory, at least, adults can expect to be treated with equal 
constitutional rights and regard as other adults, to be held responsible for 
their actions in criminal and civil law, and to operate free of arbitrary or 
unjustified interference from the state. Again, the state does not always 
interact with individuals in this idealized manner, but the norms underlying 
the adult-state relationship stand in significant contrast to those present in 
the child-state relationship.  
With respect to third parties, adults are treated as responsible, competent, 
and autonomous. This means that they are free to engage in market activity 
without age-based restrictions and are held responsible for the consequences 
of their actions in both contract and tort. Indeed, classifications based on 
age after the threshold of majority are subject to constitutional and statutory 
scrutiny. Although the Equal Protection Clause has done little work in the 
 
54. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 47, at 1463.  
55. See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 47, 50 (2012) (“The infancy doctrine protects persons under the legally designated age of 
adulthood from both ‘crafty adults’ and their own bad judgment. The doctrine is based on the 
presumption that minors are generally easily exploitable and less capable of understanding the nature of 
legal obligations that come with a contract. For ease of administration and clarity in application, the rule 
was settled with a categorical age cutoff line without regard to whether any particular individual is 
mature or infantile.” (footnotes omitted)). 
56. See Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
710, 721 (2007) (describing the range of state law approaches to adult children).  
57. This is except for matters of inheritance and trusts, where the nature of the relationship might 
shield the parties for certain taxation rules or might govern intestate rules, and so on. This aspect of the 












domain of age, where the low bar of rational basis review is applied,58 age 
discrimination laws do prohibit some considerations of age as the individual 
interacts with third parties.59  
C. Breaking the Binary 
The early twenty-first century is not the first era to see a radical shift in 
what it means to grow up. In 1904, G. Stanley Hall introduced a striking 
new concept into the American vocabulary, which he called 
“adolescence.” 60  His transformative notion was that individuals went 
through a distinct developmental period of mental and psychological 
maturation between childhood and adulthood.61 “Adolescence” took hold in 
psychology and popular culture, and eventually the law followed. 
Throughout the twentieth century, law began to treat adolescents 
differently. Laws regulating contract capacity, labor, marital consent, and 
criminal culpability started to track cultural conceptions of development.62 
No longer was someone made an adult by fiat, often through public ritual at 
a designated age. 63  Instead, adulthood came gradually, as the person 
matured.64 Whereas a nineteenth-century American might have thought it 
absurd to have special laws governing the transition to adulthood, by the 
end of the twentieth century, these considerations were commonplace. The 
belief that adolescence represented a real—and legally cognizable—life 
stage was well settled.65  
In the later part of the twentieth century, Frank Zimring’s foundational 
book The Changing Legal World of Adolescence initiated a period of serious 
 
58. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (holding that age classifications 
are subject to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause).  
59. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2018) (regulating age discrimination in employment).  
60. G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE (1904). 
61. See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescence: Brilliance and Nonsense, 9 HIST. 
PSYCHOL. 186 (2006) (situating Hall’s work in the history of psychology).  
62. See, e.g., Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1271–72 (2000) (recounting the history of adolescence in law in the twentieth 
century). 
63. For a cultural history of age laws in the United States, see AGE IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL 
ERA TO THE PRESENT, supra note 27. 
64. During the scope of this period, the common law age of majority remained at twenty-one, 
but the relevance of that age for most young people was minimal, as it applied primarily to the capacity 
to transfer property, a concern only for the elites. Functional adulthood in terms of labor, criminal 
culpability, and other features relevant to everyday life arose much earlier; at some points in time 
children as young as seven were effectively treated as adults under the common law. See HOLLY 
BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN 
AUTHORITY 131–33 (2005) (discussing the historical contours of minimum ages in various legal 
domains).  
65. Some of Hall’s research and conclusions seem woefully outdated to a modern audience and 
have been discredited by more recent psychologists, but his theories have nevertheless had a powerful 
influence on law and culture. See Arnett, supra note 61, at 187.  











consideration of how younger and older children differ.66 In 1982, Zimring 
observed that: 
Adolescence . . . is both a period in itself and a transition. It is a term 
of years when those not yet adult are engaged in the process of 
becoming adult, a rich but often stressful period of trial and error. As 
a period of semi-autonomy, it places special burdens on legal 
reasoning and public choice. As a transition to adulthood, it demands 
a future orientation in public policy: How we grow up is an important 
determinant of what kinds of adults we grow up to be.67 
The notion that adolescents are different both from younger children and 
from adults has shaped the contours of legal regulation. Law gives special 
attention to teenagers with respect to First Amendment rights,68 criminal 
law,69 sexual and reproductive rights,70 and the balance of power between 
parents and the state.71 
In some cases, throughout adolescence, categorical bans on specific 
activities transform into contingent rights, which in turn become 
autonomous rights of the individual. Marriage is a telling example.72 In 
many states, minors are permitted to marry before the age of majority. 73 In 
 
66. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982). Other 
scholars writing during this period and beyond have also been instrumental, including Barry Feld who 
began writing on juvenile justice at around the time of Zimring’s work. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile 
Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the “Rehabilitative Ideal,” 65 
MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981). 
67.  ZIMRING, supra note 66, at x–xi.  
68. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (finding unconstitutional limits on 
the sale of “violent” video games to minors); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing 
exemptions from public school attendance on religious grounds for older children); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (granting school-aged children limited free speech 
rights).  
69. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life without the 
possibility of parole for minors); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (explaining that age is 
relevant for Miranda analysis); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (prohibiting the death 
penalty for minors); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (granting juveniles due process protections), 
abrogated in part by Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986). 
70. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (declaring two-parent notification statute 
for minors seeking abortion unconstitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (extending abortion 
rights to minors regarding override of parental notification and consent); Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extending, in some cases, the right to procreative privacy to minors). 
71. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (granting limited due process protections to minors 
whose parents sought to have them committed to hospitals).  
72. For recent controversy over this practice, see Nicholas Kristof, An American 13-Year-Old, 
Pregnant and Married to Her Rapist, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01 
/opinion/sunday/child-marriage-delaware.html [https://perma.cc/AQX2-CRLH] (describing how states 
permit parental consent for minors to marry as part of an effort to reduce the number of children born 
out of wedlock).  
73. See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 19, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019) (compiling rules 












some states, there is no minimum age,74 but in most, there is a minimum 
threshold, which can be as young as thirteen or fourteen. States also include 
provisions conditioning marriage on parental consent; however, these laws 
do not always coincide with the age of majority. Therefore, in some 
jurisdictions, minors can marry without parental consent.75 For adolescents, 
marital capacity is staged: at some ages, marriage is categorically 
prohibited; at others, it is possible with consent of a parent; and at still 
others, one can enter marriage freely.  
Law is full of judgments about adolescents’ developmental capacities 
and their changing relationships vis-à-vis the family, community, and state. 
Nevertheless, the default rule for adolescents remains the care and control 
model of the parent-child relationship.76 Their rights and responsibilities are 
viewed through the lens of minority, where the default presumption is 
incapacity and dependency. This Article addresses the reverse problem: 
emerging adults are legal adults, but may not have the same capacities and 
behaviors as older adults. The default legal regime is flipped, and thus the 
challenges and their related reforms take on a different character than those 
proposed for adolescents. This Article asks: what would it mean to treat 
adulthood as equally divisible?  
The previous section showed how psychological, social, and economic 
forces have shifted the way that people experience their late teens and early 
twenties. These differences have implications for how law ought to govern 
this group’s interactions with the world. Emerging adults are no longer 
under the control of their parents, but many remain reliant on parental 
support. Economic and social forces that make emerging adults uniquely 
vulnerable, combined with their developing capacities for decision-making 
and impulse control, suggest that the state might play a different role for 
emerging adults than would be necessary for older adults. Although the 
parens patriae rules no longer apply to the emerging adult’s relationship to 
the state, the unique vulnerabilities of this age call for additional state 
support. Likewise, the emerging adult’s role in relation to the market is 
neither that of the fully dependent child nor the autonomous economic actor 
that characterizes legal adulthood. As the emerging adult enters the market 
as an autonomous actor, there too, certain protections might be warranted.  
 
74. In practice, however, it is unlikely that the state would countenance a pre-adolescent marriage 
regardless of parental consent. 
75. Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of 
Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1832 (2012) (reviewing marital age laws); Survey, 
Marriage Age Requirements, 80 SURVS. 22 (2016) (compiling state law on marriage age, and noting that 
some states have begun to require counseling for minors before obtaining a marriage license).  
76. Emancipation provides a striking exception. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor 
Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 240 (1992) 
(discussing the legal effects of statutory emancipation on minors and the parent-child relationship).  











The descriptive account of emerging adulthood, and of the laws that 
structure childhood and adulthood, reveals the ways in which granting “full” 
adulthood at eighteen does not match social reality. Adolescence already 
complicated the picture of the adult-child binary. It could be that emerging 
adulthood is just a longer adolescence, and not its own life stage at all. 
Perhaps what is needed is simply to extend the rules of adolescence to later 
ages. But as Arnett and others point out, there are certain features of 
emerging adulthood that differentiate it from adolescence in ways that are 
relevant to law. The end of high school marks a significant transition point, 
as does moving out of the parental home. Eighteen marks a moment at 
which choices expand significantly, with consequences for the rest of one’s 
life.  
II. THE EMERGING LAW OF EMERGING ADULTS 
This Part shows how a law of emerging adults is already developing. 
Cognizant of at least some of the ways in which emerging adulthood is 
incompatible with the child/adult binary in law, lawmakers have begun to 
innovate with upward departures from the standard age of majority. 
Legislatures, executive officials, and judges at both the state and federal 
level are engaged in building a new law of emerging adults. These efforts, 
however, are far from systematic, nor do they reveal a shared consensus on 
how law ought to treat emerging adults. To draw out some of the through-
lines and contradictions in the current law, this Part examines three areas in 
which emerging adults are treated differently. These areas—parental 
obligations, federal intervention, and punishment—illustrate how states and 
the federal government, legislatures, and courts govern the relationships of 
emerging adults to the family, market, and state.  
A. Parental Obligations 
The change in parental support from obligation to discretion marks a 
fundamental shift from childhood to adulthood. The default presumption is 
that parents no longer have legally enforceable financial obligations toward 
their major children.77 In practice, however, many parents do continue to 
provide financial help.78 Indeed, the American system of higher education 
 
77. See Survey, Termination of Child Support and Support Beyond Age of Majority, 80 SURVS. 
7 (2018).  
78. According to a study by Merrill Lynch in 2018, more than 70 percent of parents provided 














assumes and relies upon this fact.79 The extent to which emerging adults 
have access to financial assistance from their parents shapes many of their 
life choices during the period after their legal claims to support have ended, 
but before they have the means to be self-sufficient. And not every state cuts 
off parental support to young people upon their eighteenth birthdays. 
Exceptions to the default rule highlight which young people states view as 
deserving of continued support and for what purposes.  
Parental support comes in two basic forms: custodial and non-
custodial.80 Parents who exercise custodial rights over minor children have 
a concurrent obligation to ensure that the child’s needs are met. For non-
custodial parents, support obligations tend to arise through child support 
orders or support agreements effectuated during divorce. Child support 
disputes usually arise in the context of divorced or unmarried parents, where 
the non-custodial parent has a financial obligation toward the child.81 This 
means that, often, adult child support cases involve a non-custodial parent 
disputing any further responsibility for a child who has turned eighteen.82  
Traditionally, almost all parental support obligations ended at the age of 
majority, or in some states, when a child finished high school (whichever 
came later). Some groups of adult children have long held legal claims on 
parental support.83 The most common instance of adult child support laws 
is for individuals who are unable to care for themselves due to mental or 
physical disability. In many states, parents retain lifelong obligations toward 
children who fall within the statutory definition of a dependent adult child. 
Notably these laws often limit parental support obligations to adult children 
whose disability manifested during their minority.84 In other words, in these 
jurisdictions, parents are not responsible for misfortunes that befall their 
 
79. Students applying for federal student loans, for example, use the Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid (FAFSA), which requires detailed information about parental assets and income as part of 
the eligibility calculation. See Wondering How the Amount of Your Federal Student Aid Is Determined?, 
FED. STUDENT AID: OFF. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.gov/complete-aid-process/how-calcul 
ated#efc [https://perma.cc/LM5Z-8LKK] (explaining the “expected family contribution”). Other private 
financial aid may or may not be contingent on parental income or parental contribution expectations.  
80. For the general principles guiding child support rules, see, for example, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2002). 
81. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support 
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 345 (2005). 
82. See Sophia Arzoumanidis, Why Requiring Parents to Pay for Postsecondary Education Is 
Unconstitutional and Bad Policy, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 314, 321 (2016) (contrasting Pennsylvania’s 
treatment of higher education obligations for divorced and married parents).  
83. See Erica Fumagalli, Comment, A Survey of Post-Majority Child Support for Adults with 
Impairments, 29 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 433, 436 (2017) (charting the range of approaches that 
states take to child support for adults).  
84. An example of such a statute is: “1. A parent shall support beyond the age of majority his or 
her child with a handicap until the child is no longer handicapped or until the child becomes self-
supporting. The handicap of the child must have occurred before the age of majority for this duty to 
apply.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.110 (2018). 











children during adulthood. The rule provides some security for parents, but 
it also means that many people with similar needs will not have the same 
legal entitlements. These support obligations recognize that some 
individuals will not make the typical progression through life stages, but 
will remain, for at least some relevant purposes, tethered to the parent-child 
relationship formed during minority.85 
A less common, but growing, area of parental support obligations for 
adult children focuses more squarely on the distinct needs of emerging 
adults. These laws include the extension of child support to age twenty-one 
or for the purpose of funding higher education. Three main models appear 
in state law: (1) extending support obligations past the age of majority is not 
envisioned in the law; (2) extending support obligations past the age of 
majority is possible, subject to judicial approval; or (3) extending support 
obligations past the age of the majority is the default rule for certain 
categories (namely, higher education).86  
According to a 2018 survey, about half of states’ child support laws do 
not contain provisions permitting the extension of child support past the age 
of majority except in narrow cases of disability. 87  The rest include 
provisions pertaining to the extension of child support. Some recognize that 
divorcing parents can agree to extend parental support beyond the age of 
majority for education (typically up to a maximum age in the early 
twenties).88 A small group of states, however, provide for extensions of 
child support even where the parents have not expressly agreed. For 
example, the Missouri law states that:  
If when a child reaches age eighteen, the child is enrolled in and 
attending a secondary school program of instruction, the parental 
support obligation shall continue, if the child continues to attend and 
progresses toward completion of said program, until the child 
completes such program or reaches age twenty-one, whichever first 
occurs.89 
Massachusetts law goes even further, stating that: 
 
85. See Buhai, supra note 56, at 716–17. 
86. Compare, e.g., Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1984) (“[A]ny duty to [provide 
higher education for a  child] is a moral rather than legal one.”), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 3587 (West 
2019) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court has the authority to approve a stipulated 
agreement by the parents to pay for the support of an adult child or for the continuation of child support 
after a child attains the age of 18 years and to make a support order to effectuate the agreement.”). 
87. Survey, supra note 77. 
88. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(C) (2019) (“The court may order and enforce the 
payment of support for the maintenance and education after high school of emancipated children of the 
marriage pursuant to a written agreement between the parties.”). 












The probate court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, 
support and education of any child who has attained age eighteen but 
who has not attained age twenty-one and who is domiciled in the 
home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for 
maintenance. The court may make appropriate orders of 
maintenance, support and education for any child who has attained 
age twenty-one but who has not attained age twenty-three if such 
child is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally 
dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to the enrollment of 
such child in an educational program, excluding educational costs 
beyond an undergraduate degree.90 
Extending child support laws provides formal obligations and 
consequences for parents who fail to conform to middle class social norms 
around contributing to a child’s higher education. As Sally Goldfarb 
observed, “[t]here is no social consensus in favor of parental support for 
adult children, with the exception of support for students in college.”91 
Because, Goldfarb notes, non-custodial divorced parents are less likely than 
married parents (of similar incomes) to voluntarily pay for their child’s 
college education, “a court award of post-majority college support does not 
create an inequity, but rather prevents an inequity by ensuring that children 
of divorced parents enjoy the same educational opportunities as children of 
married parents.”92  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took the opposite view in its 1995 
decision, holding that extending parental support obligations for education 
past the age of majority violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that:  
In the absence of an entitlement on the part of any individual to post-
secondary education, or a generally applicable requirement that 
parents assist their adult children in obtaining such an education, we 
perceive no rational basis for the state government to provide only 
certain adult citizens with legal means to overcome the difficulties 
they encounter in pursuing that end.93 
Whether or not extending child support past the age of majority reflects 
a desirable recognition of the realities of emerging adulthood presents a 
difficult question. On the one hand, these laws provide an enforceable claim 
for financial assistance at a time when such help is often much needed. On 
 
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 37 (2019).  
91. Sally F. Goldfarb, Who Pays for the “Boomerang Generation”?: A Legal Perspective on 
Financial Support for Young Adults, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 45, 66 (2014).  
92. Id. at 75.  
93. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 269–70 (Pa. 1995) (footnote omitted).  











the other hand, extending parental support exacerbates inequalities between 
families and risks extending parental control over their adult children’s 
lives.  
An initial consideration of lawmakers is scope. As explained above, in 
most cases emerging adults whose parents are not under a child support 
order or agreement would fall outside the scope of the newly extended 
parental obligations. A more expansive approach would extend formal 
support obligations to all parents of emerging adults. Such a rule would be 
transformative in several ways. Emerging adults would have a more 
predictable and enforceable source of support, but there are risks to such a 
policy change.  
Given the importance of higher education and its costs, I argue that 
provisions extending parental obligations are worthwhile, with the 
following caveats. First, such laws should focus on activities rather than 
ages. States that provide a set of options for families, for instance laws that 
enumerate the types of expenses that might qualify for extended support, 
rather than setting a specific age, are especially well suited to the emerging 
adult experience. This is because the key expenses of emerging adulthood, 
those that often require additional support, will not arise on the same 
schedule for every emerging adult. Rather than waking up on a specified 
birthday with no further support, the emerging adult can call upon parental 
obligations for specific kinds of support.94  
Second, continued parental support must address the severability of 
different aspects of majority. Parental rights (including visitation), custody, 
and child support obligations are legally distinct inquiries and may not be 
linked (i.e., an obligation to pay child support may not entail visitation 
rights). 95  Nevertheless, the connection between parental rights and 
obligations toward a child do appear to be linked in both law and cultural 
understanding to some degree. 96  Put differently, because support and 
 
94. This can also be done through incentives, such as tax preferences for accounts designated for 
higher education. For more on this type of college savings account, see An Introduction to 529 Plans, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-public 
ations/investorpubsintro529htm.html [https://perma.cc/ZWN8-JXBL].  
95. Laurie S. Kohn, Money Can’t Buy You Love, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 74 (2015) 
(distinguishing support orders and visitation or parenting time).  
96. I do not seek to make a definitive claim that parental support and authority are indivisible, 
only to suggest that de facto extended parental control could be a consequence of legal expectations to 
keep paying for adult children. See Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights 
Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 137 (2016) (“[F]athers’ rights activists argued 
that the Enforcement Amendments should link fathers’ child support obligations to reciprocal visitation 
and custody rights.”). For anecdotal evidence of this see, for example, Daniel Mallory Ortberg, Help! 
My Parents Check My Grades and Read My Email Even Though I’m in College. Is That Normal?, 













control are both elements of the parent-child relationship, even when they 
are legally distinct, lawmakers ought to be alert to the possibility that 
parents will expect financial obligations to come with a corollary right over 
the child. Law should make clear what, if any, authority parents retain 
during a period of extended support to emerging adult children. 
Even if altering parental obligations would have no negative 
consequences for the parent-child relationship within families, changing the 
law could exacerbate inequalities between families. Privatizing dependency 
for higher education only works for families with the means to pay. Young 
people whose families cannot afford to continue supporting adult children, 
as well as those who cannot rely on parental support for many other 
reasons,97 are without recourse. Without greater investment from the state 
to make education affordable, extending child support requirements will 
only help a small subset of emerging adults. 
An additional consideration that lawmakers ought to take into account is 
whether extending the right to child support past the age of majority changes 
the scope of judicial discretion to order and enforce support orders. A 
categorical increase in the child support age would provide more clarity ex 
ante for both parents and children. It might also remove discretion from 
judges to determine which young people are deserving of continued support. 
Whether the desirable attributes of an across-the-board and legally 
enforceable expectation that parents will provide some form of support for 
emerging adults outweigh the risks within and between families is a 
calculation that state legislatures ought to seriously consider.  
B. Federal Interventions 
The construction of legal adulthood is a shared project of the federal 
government and the states. This section will address two notable instances 
where federal legislation protects emerging adults, both of which occurred 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis when young people just starting in 
the workforce were particularly vulnerable. 98 
 
GU2-4MB3] (describing a college student whose parents insist on having access to her university email 
account). 
97. For instance, young people who are in foster care or are estranged from their parents.  
98. Another issue that has come to prominence during the last several election cycles, and which 
is poised to be a key issue among Democratic candidates in the 2020 Presidential election, is that of 
student debt. See Madeleine Joung, Here’s How 2020 Democrats’ Student Loan Debt Proposals 
Compare, TIME (June 24, 2019), https://time.com/5613425/student-loan-forgiveness-bernie-sanders/ [ht 
tps://perma.cc/8M57-4W6J].  
Educational debt, as it is currently regulated, complicates the picture of special solicitude toward 
young people’s vulnerabilities. Under current bankruptcy rules, educational debt is only dischargeable 
if “undue hardship” is demonstrated, a higher standard than is required for other forms of debt. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8) (2018). For a recent analysis of this exception to general bankruptcy rules, see John Patrick 
Hunt, Help or Hardship?: Income-Driven Repayment in Student-Loan Bankruptcies, 106 GEO. L.J. 











The first example of federal intervention is the Credit Card 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“CARD 
Act”). 99  In the wake of the 2008 recession, Congress passed sweeping 
legislation reigning in lending practices, which had contributed to the 
unsustainable debt load carried by many Americans. Among these reforms 
was Title III of the CARD Act. This provision contained two features that 
reflected the lawmakers’ views on young people, particularly college 
students. The Act provides an especially illustrative case because it 
combines a variety of tools to regulate emerging adults’ interactions with 
the market. 
The CARD Act aims to protect young people from risky financial 
choices in response to credit card companies’ advertising on college 
campuses. It also allocates financial responsibility by restricting when 
individuals under twenty-one can obtain a credit card without a co-signor. 
In so doing, the law implicitly, although not explicitly, regulates the parent-
child relationship. 
The Act requires an older adult co-signor or proof of independent income 
for individuals under age twenty-one. 100  In addition to a protective 
rationale—that a young person should not be saddled with debt she cannot 
repay—is a cost-allocation rationale; someone will be obliged to pay.101 The 
protective rationale might seem somewhat thin: when compared to the 
average student loan burden, the risk of credit card debt pales.102 The co-
signor rule does not specify who is eligible to co-sign, other than that they 
must be over twenty-one. Some commentators at the time thought that 
young people might ask slightly older peers to act as co-signors, much as 
they ask older classmates to buy beer.103 Although there appears to be little 
empirical data on the effects of the 2009 law, one study of college students 
suggests, unsurprisingly, that most of the students who applied for credit 
cards with a co-signor chose a parent.104  
 
1287, 1311 (2018) (reviewing the legislative history of bankruptcy laws concerning student debt, and 
concluding that Congress was not making a judgment about the nature of students as debtors, but rather 
trying to increase recovery of debt backed by the federal government).  
99. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 
123 Stat. 1734. 
100. Id. § 301(A)–(B).  
101. See Jim Hawkins, The CARD Act on Campus, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1471, 1473 (2012) 
(discussing the rationale for Title III of the CARD Act).  
102. For recent data on student loan debt in the United States, see Anthony Cilluffo, Five Facts 
About Student Loans, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/2 
4/5-facts-about-student-loans/ (including that 37 percent of adults age eighteen to twenty-nine have 
outstanding student loan debt, and that Americans owe more than $1.3 trillion in student loans); see also 
Eboni S. Nelson, From the Schoolhouse to the Poorhouse: The Credit Card Act's Failure to Adequately 
Protect Young Consumers, 56 VILL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2011) (discussing student debt).  
103. Hawkins, supra note 101, at 1515–16.  












Credit card companies are also prohibited from offering tangible rewards 
for signing up for a credit card on or near a college campus.105 One plausible 
explanation for this provision is that the drafters viewed college students as 
easily seduced into risky debt behavior by the instant gratification of free 
gifts. Another is that, unlike other segments of the adult population, colleges 
are still very age segregated so they are convenient locations to target young 
people who are eager to use their new contractual freedom and become 
active and independent consumers.  
The Act also regulates agreements between universities and credit card 
companies.106 This provision reflects the uneasy role of the university and 
its responsibility to its students. Universities are not custodians or guardians 
of their students, and many institutions make significant money through 
students outside of tuition (collegiate athletics being a striking example 
where the interests of the institution and the student may not always 
align).107 Requiring, at a minimum, transparency regarding the university’s 
contract with a credit card company expresses, in part, the legislature’s view 
that institutions of higher education have a special relationship to their 
students that requires special rules, ranging from a special duty of care to 
increased transparency.108  
Under the CARD Act, age serves to delineate a staged process by which 
an individual’s freedom to contract with the credit card company becomes 
gradually less restricted. Young people under eighteen are protected and 
incapacitated by the laws of minority from entering into contracts with 
credit card companies.109 After twenty-one, an individual may open a credit 
card without age-based restrictions. From eighteen to twenty-one, 
individuals are in an intermediate space in which the default rule is that they 
are unable to sign credit card contracts, but this rule can be overridden with 
a co-signor or with proof of independent means.110 This example shows that 
even regarding relationships to third parties, there can be tailored rules for 
emerging adults that are more nuanced than a threshold age. It illustrates the 
idea that emerging adults might need help engaging in the market, but 
should not be wholly excluded from it.  
 
105. CARD Act § 304 (A)–(B).  
106. CARD Act § 305. 
107. The role of universities in emerging adults’ lives is a capacious and controversial question. 
This Article does not provide an overarching answer to the question of what duties colleges owe their 
students (especially residential students). It does, however, suggest that understanding this relationship 
requires consideration of how the university serves as a conduit for developmentally specific rules for 
emerging adults.  
108. CARD Act § 305.  
109. Although, interestingly, some states do allow minors to sign contracts for educational loans.  
110. CARD Act § 301 (A)–(B). 











The second example of a federal legislative response to emerging 
adulthood is that of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) provision extending 
parental health insurance coverage to adult children up to age twenty-six.111 
This provision was enacted in response to evidence that emerging adults 
were far more likely than other adults to be uninsured.112 The choice of 
twenty-six as the threshold age represents a rare deviation from either 
eighteen or twenty-one as the cut-off point for dependency. It acknowledges 
that for many young people it takes time to develop financial independence 
and the decision-making skills required to seek out and obtain one’s own 
health insurance.113 
The ACA provides protection for financially vulnerable young people. It 
also facilitates better decision-making by setting out an easier path to 
healthcare than was previously available. Emerging adults, who might 
otherwise be insensitive to the long-term risks of living without health 
coverage, now have a clear option. Because it is linked to a parent’s health 
insurance, this Act also facilitates a sort of continued parental care for their 
emerging adult children. 
In addition to the evident inequalities faced by young people whose 
parents are unable to extend quality health coverage to their children are 
risks to emerging adults who do avail themselves of the ACA’s provision. 
Tethering emerging adults’ health insurance to a parent risks extending the 
parental control paradigm of childhood. One collateral consequence specific 
to this domain is that it might put an emerging adult’s medical privacy at 
risk. Some scholars suggest that insurance information sent to the primary 
policyholder (the parent) can reveal personal information about the care 
their adult child is seeking.114  Although not a necessary component of 
extending insurance coverage, the fact that parents retain this link to their 
children’s medical care does show that the link between support and control 
can persist well into legal adulthood.  
 
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a) (2018) (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance coverage that provides dependent coverage of children 
shall continue to make such coverage available for an adult child until the child turns 26 years of age. 
Nothing in this section shall require a health plan or a health insurance issuer described in the preceding 
sentence to make coverage available for a child of a child receiving dependent coverage.”). 
112. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Implementing Health Reform in an Era of Semi-Cooperative 
Federalism: Lessons from the Age 26 Expansion, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 327, 333 (2015). 
113. See Abrams & Barber, supra note 22, at 416. (“The lawmakers noted the trend of emerging 
adulthood, focusing in particular on the fact that young adults frequently change jobs, work in part-time 
or temporary positions that do not provide healthcare, or lack the funds to pay for their own 
healthcare. These issues meant that prior to passage of the Affordable Care Act, when young adults were 
cut off from their parents’ healthcare at twenty-one, young people over the age of twenty-one had the 
highest uninsured rate among all U.S. age groups.” (footnote omitted)). 
114. Valarie K. Blake & Jessica A. Haught, Health Care at a Price: The Impact on Young Adults’ 
Medical Privacy and Autonomy of Being Covered on Their Parents’ Health Insurance Until Age Twenty-












These recent examples demonstrate some of the comparative benefits of 
allocating authority over emerging adulthood to the states and the federal 
government. Federal legislation has the advantage of regulating nationwide 
industries and providing uniform market protections for emerging adults 
across the country. States, by contrast, may be better suited to regulating 
obligations and disputes within families—a competence that has long been 
within the jurisdiction of local courts.  
C. Punishment 
The U.S. Supreme Court, insofar as it has addressed the age of majority 
as a relevant constitutional principle, has gravitated toward bright-line rules. 
In recent years, the Court has precluded states from applying the harshest 
penalties to individuals who commit crimes under the age of eighteen.115 
These rules provide minimal protections for minors, but show no special 
consideration for emerging adults. Commenting on the criminal justice 
binary between childhood and adulthood, Kevin Lapp recently observed 
that:  
The blunt instrument of age divides the two systems [of criminal 
justice] . . . . While the border between the two worlds has been 
porous, it has been so only in one direction. Juveniles have always 
been subject to being charged and punished as adults for their wrongs. 
Adults, by contrast, have traditionally not had access to a 
rehabilitative criminal justice institution . . . .116 
Some states have gone beyond what is required under federal 
constitutional law and have experimented with programs for emerging 
adults who are already incarcerated. These reforms acknowledge the distinct 
needs of emerging adults in prison and provide a sort of buffer from the 
most punitive aspects of prison life, for instance by providing additional 
mentoring or other services.117 Advocates for these reforms point to high 
recidivism rates for emerging adults as evidence that punitive prison 
 
115. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life without the 
possibility of parole for minors); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting the death 
penalty for minors). In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court, holding that Miller applied 
retroactively, addressed when states must permit for “youth and attendant characteristics” to be 
considered in sentencing, but the opinion refers specifically to individuals who committed crimes as 
minors, even if they were tried as adults. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016), as 
revised (Jan. 27, 2016). 
116. Lapp, supra note 14, at 358.  
117. A notable example of the advocacy and scholarship efforts to shed light on the distinct 
features of emerging adults in the criminal justice system is the Columbia University Justice Lab 
Emerging Adult Project. More information about this project can be found at Emerging Adult Justice, 
COLUM. U. JUST. LAB, https://justicelab.columbia.edu/EAJ [https://perma.cc/N28F-5JFP]. 











conditions—rather than systems aimed to help them through the 
developmental process of reaching adulthood—cause greater harm to the 
individual and to society than do punitive measures for older adults.118  
Under this view, the fact that emerging adults are still in the process of 
psychological and neurological development warrants reconsideration of 
the state’s responsibility toward them. In Connecticut, for example, the state 
prison system instituted programs particularly designed for emerging adults. 
By aiming to reduce the severity of sentencing, and to improve the 
conditions of confinement for emerging adult offenders, these reforms 
acknowledge that the emerging adult’s relationship to the state might be 
different from that of an older adult.119  
Other prisons have followed Connecticut’s example and begun to 
implement similar programs. Although they vary in many details, these 
programs share a set of important features: mentorship, structure, education, 
and opportunities to learn from past mistakes. 120  Since many of these 
programs are quite recent, there remains much to learn about their 
effectiveness at reducing recidivism. 121  The focus on mentorship and 
learning, however, suggests that some innovative lawmakers and prison 
officials are taking seriously what makes emerging adults different and what 
they need to be successful, even under extreme conditions like 
incarceration. 
 
118. See SELEN SIRINGIL PERKER & LAEL CHESTER, MALCOLM WEINER CTR. FOR SOC. POL’Y, 
EMERGING ADULT JUSTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 2 (2017) (“Emerging adults are not only more likely to 
be incarcerated, but also more likely to recidivate when they leave a correctional facility.”). 
119. In Connecticut, Governor Malloy instituted a new Department of Corrections Unit in 2017 
called the T.R.U.E. (Truthfulness, Respect, Understand, and Elevating) program designed to work with 
emerging adult inmates to reduce recidivism and support mentorship. Press Release, Office of Governor 
Dannel P. Malloy, Gov. Malloy Announces Opening of State’s New Corrections Unit Exclusively for 
Young Adult Offenders (Mar. 13, 2017), https://portal.ct.gov/Malloy-Archive/Press-Room/Press-Releas 
es/2017/03-2017/Gov-Malloy-Announces-Opening-of-States-New-Corrections-Unit-Exclusively-for-
Young-Adult-Offenders [https://perma.cc/XZ58-BUWU].  
120. Some examples include the PEACE unit for inmates under age twenty-five at the South Bay 
House of Corrections in Boston, which includes officers trained in restorative justice; the Young Men 
Emerging Unit in Washington, D.C. for eighteen-to-twenty-five-year-olds who are incarcerated; and the 
South Carolina program, which is expressly modeled on Connecticut’s TRUE Unit, which includes daily 
mentorship by older inmates. See Simón Rios, Suffolk Sheriff Sets Up Family-Oriented Cell Block to 
Keep Young Inmates Out of Jail, WBUR (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.wbur.org/news/2018/11/30/peac 
e-unit-south-bay-jail-boston [https://perma.cc/5BU9-8MTV]; Marc Schindler, Youth Rehabilitation in 
D.C.: From Controversy to Progress, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2019, 2:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpo 
st.com/opinions/youth-rehabilitation-in-dc-from-controversy-to-progress/2019/01/11/d2ea0be6-056a-1 
1e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/W874-98W4]; Annie Mapp, SC 
Prison Program Aims to Decrease Violence, Help Young Inmates Succeed, WBTW (May 7, 2019, 10:57 
PM), https://www.wbtw.com/news/state-regional-news/sc-prison-program-aims-to-decrease-violence-
help-young-inmates-succeed/ [https://perma.cc/C7QH-K5UU].  
121. For ongoing research on prison programs for emerging adults, see the Emerging Adult Justice 
Project, a part of the Columbia University Justice Lab, available at: Recent Reforms, EMERGING ADULT 












These efforts demonstrate that laws pertaining to emerging adults need 
not be prohibitive thresholds—as under the CARD Act—or default 
presumptions for private interactions—as with parental support 
obligations—but can include affirmative duties on the part of states to treat 
emerging adults differently. The state’s duty to take the unique 
developmental features of emerging adulthood into account is especially 
important for emerging adults in state custody. This group of young people 
is prevented from participating in most of the developmental processes that 
their peers are going through in the outside world, so the state’s decisions 
about what opportunities to provide become essential.  
III. BUILDING A NEW LAW OF EMERGING ADULTS 
The examples presented in the previous Part raise many questions about 
the role of the law in shaping the emerging adult experience: How much 
authority should be given to parents? What is the state’s duty to protect 
emerging adults from particular age-related vulnerabilities? What values or 
choices should the law seek to promote? And what form ought such laws to 
take? This next Part provides a guide to lawmakers and advocates seeking 
to expand upon recent efforts to treat emerging adults differently in the law.  
To that end, I propose three guiding principles that coalesce around the 
elements of emerging adulthood that make this life stage distinct. These 
principles serve as a metric against which to judge legal reform. The 
objective is to capture two sides of the same coin: what makes emerging 
adults uniquely vulnerable and also what makes them uniquely open to 
learning and growth.  
These principles reflect the lived experience of emerging adults as 
described in Part I. They are also grounded in an underlying normative 
position: the state has an obligation to protect vulnerable individuals and to 
reduce or ameliorate inequality. Much has been written about these 
normative commitments, which extends far beyond the scope of this 
Article.122 The goal here is to present a roadmap for the law of emerging 
adulthood that is consistent with normative traditions which demand more 
of the state than merely non-interference in private ordering.  
An approach that typifies this position is Martha Fineman’s vulnerability 
theory.123 In her words, “A vulnerability approach argues that the state must 
 
122. A prominent instance of scholars applying this normative commitment to the transition from 
childhood to adulthood is BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999), 
in which the authors propose that when each American reaches the age of majority, they receive a 
financial investment from the state.  
123. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 341, 
355–56 (2019) (“[The] liberal legal subject is a fully functioning adult—in charge and capable of making 
choices. . . . The attainment of liberal economic roles—such as job creator, entrepreneur, taxpayer, and, 











be responsive to the realities of human vulnerability and its corollary, social 
dependency, as well as to situations reflecting inherent or necessary 
inequality, when it initially establishes or sets up mechanisms to monitor 
these relationships and institutions.” 124  This Article is consistent with 
Fineman’s view that dependency is a public and social concern, not one that 
should be relegated exclusively to the private sphere.125  
Recognizing that the formal autonomy ascribed to emerging adults under 
the current law is often illusory because of the structural, economic, and 
psychological reasons described in this paper, I argue in favor of reforms 
that enhance autonomy, rather than emphasize dependency. This position 
reflects a more nuanced notion of autonomy for emerging adults than just 
whether there are formal legal impediments to their liberty. Emerging 
adulthood is a particularly complex age because the very thing that makes 
emerging adults vulnerable—uncertainty, lack of experience, need for 
guidance, and education—is also what makes emerging adulthood such a 
transformative and generative life stage.  
A. Guiding Principles 
With that in mind, a new law of emerging adults should seek to maximize 
the benefits and minimize the harm of the following three features of 
emerging adulthood:  
First, laws should protect emerging adults from economic vulnerability 
related to their age. Because of their age, emerging adults are just entering 
the workforce and so have not had time to build savings or access higher 
paying opportunities reserved for more experienced workers. Many pursue 
higher education, which is both costly and delays full-time employment. For 
the first time in most of their lives, no one is legally obligated to pay for 
their food, clothing, housing, and other basic needs. Although many 
emerging adults can and do support themselves, this can come at a cost to 
long-term investments, such as education or savings. Emerging adults are 
also at a disadvantage insofar as they have less experience as autonomous 
 
of course, consumer—define the aspirations and determine the values for this legal subject. . . . 
Vulnerability theory challenges this limited and inaccurate vision of legal subjectivity. It suggests that a 
legal subject that is primarily defined by vulnerability and need, rather than exclusively by rationality 
and liberty, more fully reflects the human condition. As such, it has the power to disrupt the logic of 
personal responsibility and individual liberty built on the liberal stereotype of an independent and 
autonomous individual. Recognition of human vulnerability mandates that the neoliberal legal subject 
be replaced with the vulnerable legal subject, even as a responsive state is substituted for the restrained 
state of liberal imagination.” (footnote omitted)). 
124. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 4 OSLO L. REV. 133, 
134 (2017). Fineman has written about vulnerability in a wide range of books and articles, but this recent 
account of her own body of work provides a useful summary of the key contours of her theory.  












actors in the marketplace and are still developing the decision-making 
capacities of older adults.  
Laws regulating emerging adults’ relationship to the market, therefore, 
ought to be more protective of young people than the current system 
provides. As the parental support obligations and credit card examples 
show, some efforts in that direction exist. 126  But these examples also 
illustrate the risk that parent-focused protective measures (such as requiring 
parental support or co-signing) will interfere with another key element of 
emerging adulthood, reflected in the second principle.  
The second principle is that law should support emerging adults’ 
developing independence, especially as it relates to the parental home. This 
principle highlights the risk of relying on continued parental support as the 
answer to the vulnerabilities of emerging adulthood. For many young 
people, such support will simply not exist, no matter what law requires. 
Even for those who can continue to rely on parents, reifying the legal 
dependence of childhood is not the answer. This is not to say that parental 
support for emerging adults should be prohibited, but rather that it can be, 
at best, a part of the answer.  
Emerging adulthood is not merely an extension of childhood. However, 
lawmakers can and should account for the fact that becoming an adult is a 
transition, not a binary. To that end, legal reforms ought to foster and 
support the unique role of emerging adults in relation to others. Most 
notably, the law of emerging adults should focus on the development of 
relationships outside of the parent-child dynamic of minority.  
Borrowing an idea from developmental psychology—“autonomy with 
connection”—helps to elaborate what it would mean for law to support 
emerging adult relationships.127 Connected autonomy has two components. 
The first is a sense of self and control over one’s life and choices.128 The 
 
126. See supra Part II.A–B. 
127. See, e.g., Patricia K. Kerig, Julie A. Swanson & Rose Marie Ward, Autonomy with 
Connection: Influences of Parental Psychological Control on Mutuality in Emerging Adults’ Close 
Relationships, in ADOLESCENCE AND BEYOND: FAMILY PROCESSES AND DEVELOPMENT 134, 134 
(Patricia K. Kerig, Marc S. Schulz & Stuart T. Hauser eds., 2012) (noting that connected autonomy 
entails “a sense of belonging and a sense of being separate” and that one of the primary goals of emerging 
adulthood is developing “healthy intimate relationships outside the family” (quoting SALVADOR 
MINUCHIN, FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPY 47 (1974))); Susie D. Lamborn & Kelly Groh, A Four-
Part Model of Autonomy During Emerging Adulthood: Associations with Adjustment, 33 INT’L J. 
BEHAV. DEV. 393 (2009) (tracing connectedness, separation, detachment, and agency in emerging adult 
relationships with their parents).  
128. See Daena Goldsmith, A Dialectic Perspective on the Expression of Autonomy and 
Connection in Romantic Relationships, 54 WESTERN J. SPEECH COMM. 537, 538 (1990) (“Autonomy is 
the desire and ability to be self-sufficient, self-contained, self-defined and accountable only to one’s self. 
Connection is the desire and ability to be reliant on others, to be relied on, to be connected with others, 
and to be defined in relation to others. Achieving either one in the purest form requires the negation of 
the other. However, autonomy and connection are also interrelated. Relationships connect autonomous 
selves and we come to know ourselves through our relationships with others.”). 











second is a sense of how one’s own needs and goals are interconnected with 
the needs of others.129 Emerging adulthood ought to be a time in which a 
person learns to care for herself, to make decisions (large and small) that are 
consistent with her values and aims, and to make choices that are supportive 
of the needs and values of those around her. The capacity for connected 
autonomy takes time and is not a solo journey. It requires iterative 
interactions with other people in contexts that permit freedom of choice, but 
also guidance.  
The power of connected autonomy as a governing legal norm for 
emerging adulthood becomes clear when the rules of adulthood are 
imagined in terms of relationships. The objective, during this transitional 
period, is to preserve and create ties to others, while at the same time to 
encourage autonomous decision-making. The key is that there be a balance 
between the self and others. Extending the dependency rules of childhood 
would be the most protective approach to emerging adulthood, and 
entrenching the full panoply of adult rights and responsibilities would be 
the most autonomy respecting, but neither extreme is desirable. If kept 
under the regime of childhood, the emerging adult is restricted in her 
capacity to form relationships outside of the family and in her ability to act 
autonomously. But, if pushed into independence without support, she will 
lose the chance to build her network of connections from a place of some 
stability and security.  
The third guiding principle is that laws governing emerging adults should 
emphasize learning and growth. As the developmental psychology and 
neuroscience research shows, emerging adults are prone to risky decisions, 
experimentation, and mistakes that are less likely to occur with older 
adults.130 Laws that expose emerging adults to the full consequences of their 
decisions fail to recognize that making mistakes, and learning from them, is 
a desirable feature of emerging adulthood. At the same time, a part of 
learning from mistakes is being accountable for them. The law of emerging 
adults should not shield young adults from the consequences of their choices 
to the same extent as is done for younger children. However, the emerging 
adult’s potential for growth counsels in favor of more rehabilitative and less 
punitive responses.  
Criminal justice and prison reform is the clearest context in which this 
principle can be (and is) put into practice, but it is not the only arena.131 Debt 
forgiveness would be another sphere where a more emerging adult-sensitive 
legal system could soften the blow of choices made during the early years 
of newfound autonomy. In addition to protecting emerging adults from the 
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harshest ramifications of bad choices, law could also support intervention 
before risky decisions are made, with increased emphasis on consultation 
and mentorship. The overarching point is that law can, and should, be more 
flexible when it comes to emerging adults’ bad decisions without absolving 
young people of personal responsibility for the consequences.  
These three principles counsel in favor of certain substantive priorities 
for law. With the tension between dependency and autonomy at its core, the 
law of emerging adults should include elements like access to educational 
opportunities, building mentorship and relationships outside the parental 
home, sentencing and prison reform, and so on. Treating emerging 
adulthood as a transformative and experimental life stage also guides what 
form the law of emerging adults should take. The next section sets out some 
options including a single bright-line age of majority and a series of 
threshold ages, ultimately proposing a more flexible toolkit that can respond 
to the uniquely transitional nature of emerging adulthood. 
B. Bright Lines and Thresholds 
In his famous 1976 article, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, Duncan Kennedy used age as the classic example of a rule, 
rather than a standard. He observed that:  
The choice of rules as the mode of intervention involves the sacrifice 
of precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind the 
rules. Suppose that the reason for creating a class of persons who lack 
capacity is the belief that immature people lack the faculty of free 
will. Setting the age of majority at 21 years will incapacitate many 
but not all of those who lack this faculty. And it will incapacitate 
some who actually possess it. From the point of view of the purpose 
of the rules, this combined over- and underinclusiveness amounts not 
just to licensing but to requiring official arbitrariness. If we adopt the 
rule, it is because of a judgment that this kind of arbitrariness is less 
serious than the arbitrariness and uncertainty that would result from 
empowering the official to apply the standard of “free will” directly 
to the facts of each case.132 
Kennedy’s articulation of the arbitrariness of rules compared to the 
arbitrariness of individual judgment applies far beyond the specific example 
he provides. It is telling, however, that he chose age to serve as the example. 
It would be easy to view age laws as the paradigmatic bright line; it is a 
chronological fact, independent of any individualized assessment of 
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whatever qualities for which age serves as a proxy. With this vision of age 
as the paradigmatic rule in mind, scholars and lawmakers attempt to identify 
the right rule for emerging adults: one which is neither too over- nor too 
under-inclusive.  
On one end of the spectrum is the view that a single, bright line is best. 
So long as you can prove your age, you know where you stand—you can 
claim rights and entitlements, and you can expect responsibilities 
commensurate with your age. As Elizabeth Scott articulated:  
A bright line age of majority is a clear signal; all who deal with the 
young person understand that he does—or does not—have legal 
capacity. A more tailored approach that attempts to confer adult 
status in different domains on the basis of a more targeted assessment 
of maturity is likely to generate uncertainty and error. . . . A strategy 
of customized age grading introduces complexity and cost to legal 
policy, as it involves multiple judgments about the appropriate 
maturity threshold for a broad range of tasks and functions. Most 
cumbersome of all would be an approach that confers adult legal 
rights or responsibilities on the basis of individualized assessments 
of maturity.133  
The single bright line of age of majority allows all the functional 
connections between the elements of adulthood to operate together. If one 
attains all features of adulthood at the same time, then we need not worry 
about interconnected rights and responsibilities being separated. In his 
recent book, The Age of Culpability, Gideon Yaffe presents several 
interrelated connections between aspects of childhood and adulthood, which 
converge at age eighteen. He argues that what justifies treating minors 
differently from adults in the criminal context—or “giving them a break”—
is that minors cannot vote and, therefore, have less of a say in how the laws 
are constructed.134 Yaffe then ties the threshold voting age to the age at 
which parental custody ends. He concludes that “children are given a vote 
once they come of age . . . so as to give parents a means to exert influence 
over future law by exerting the influence which they are entitled to exert 
over their children’s values.” 135  By tying all of these rights and 
responsibilities together at a single threshold age, Yaffe presents a coherent 
justification for why children and adults are treated differently.  
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The bright line model is appealing in its clarity, but it has a significant 
drawback. Setting a single line after which individuals are treated as full 
adults does not track lived reality. This poses at least two problems. One is 
that people will be unable to exercise the rights and responsibilities of 
adulthood because they lack the psychological or economic capacity to do 
so. The second problem is that lawmakers, observing specific examples of 
the mismatch between law and reality, have already begun to adjust the laws 
to deviate from eighteen as the age of majority. The challenge, then, is that 
the default assumption of adulthood is not universal, but contains a set of ad 
hoc exceptions.  
Today, much of the scholarly debate over age laws focuses on an 
alternative approach: identifying correct threshold ages for each aspect of 
adulthood. Viewing age law through the lens of psychological development 
or social conceptions of maturity, it is easy to see why this approach would 
be appealing. If lawmakers can identify the right markers of maturity, they 
can calibrate the law to ensure that emerging adults (as a whole) attain 
developmentally appropriate rights and responsibilities. A threshold-based 
approach works a little like grade school. Everyone of the same age reaches 
a new level of adulthood in a manner designed to target the average person’s 
capacities.  
The threshold model suggests that young people attain the capacity to 
engage in certain types of behavior, make certain choices, or be subject to 
certain forms of responsibility at predictable ages. The current law, to some 
extent, reflects this view—individuals can drive, marry, vote, and drink at 
different ages. Critics of the current system, however, argue that the specific 
ages that lawmakers have chosen are misguided because they fail to reflect 
young people’s true needs and capacities.136  
Proponents of the threshold approach tend to identify areas of law that 
seem especially incongruous with scientific or cultural understandings of 
maturity. If the problem is framed in terms of which legal rule does not 
correspond to the age at which that right or responsibility can be 
meaningfully exercised, then a logical solution is to change the legal age. 
Both responses to Parkland take this tactic: some aspects of young people 
suggest they are mature enough to vote earlier than the law currently allows, 
other aspects suggest they are not equipped to make decisions about safe 
gun use until later. The result is two new proposed threshold ages: sixteen 
for voting and twenty-one for gun ownership.137  
Vivian Hamilton’s work has been instrumental in bringing the threshold 
approach to discussions of emerging adulthood. She has advocated for better 
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threshold ages for driving, marriage, and voting. 138 In her recent article, 
Adulthood in Law and Culture, she fully embraces the possibility of tailored 
thresholds, as she seeks the abolition of the presumptive age of majority.139 
In its place, Hamilton argues for “legal rules that account for the context-
specific acquisition of capabilities. . . . [using] relevant and readily available 
research across the social and developmental sciences, in addition to more 
traditional policy considerations.”140 Hamilton concludes that laws should 
grant rights and responsibilities at a series of ages, which are context 
specific and based on facts external to the law: 
It is possible to characterize age-related capacity as a function of: (1) 
patterns of cognitive and socio-emotional development; (2) the 
nature of the capacity being exercised (e.g., characteristics of the task 
to be performed or the decision to be made); (3) the context in which 
the capacity will be exercised; and (4) the broader social, cultural, 
and economic milieu.141 
Hamilton’s view suggests that all aspects of adulthood are severable and 
subject to review for consistency with understandings of psychological 
development or social expectations of maturity.  
There are, however, risks to treating the law of emerging adulthood as a 
set of stairs to full maturity. One problem is that in focusing on a single 
element of adulthood, it is easy to miss how different aspects are 
interconnected. A recent proposal to raise the age of contract capacity 
illustrates this problem.142  Under this view, the infancy doctrine, which 
makes some types of contracts entered into by minors voidable, should be 
extended to twenty-one.143 
This proposal, however, does not confront the question of whether 
parental support obligations would also extend to twenty-one. The 
justification for the infancy doctrine is that a minor’s parents are responsible 
for paying for the child’s lodging, education, and other expenses, so that a 
child rarely needs to enter into a contract. Given a child’s lack of experience 
and vulnerability to pressure, the thinking goes, she should not be held 
responsible for a contract she does enter into. Making contracts voidable 
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clearly discourages potential contract parties from entering into an 
agreement. This is made evident by the “necessity” exception to the 
doctrine, which made contracts with minors for necessities like food 
enforceable so that parties would not refuse to sell minors life-sustaining 
goods.144 Extending the infancy doctrine to twenty-one raises the question: 
would that also extend parental support obligations to twenty-one? If not, 
would eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-olds be able to reliably purchase cars, 
rent apartments, or engage in any of the larger commercial transactions that 
are necessary for an individual who is no longer under the care and control 
of another?145 
Adulthood is not a single, indivisible concept, but neither is it a set 
bundle of rights and responsibilities that can be separated into their 
component parts without consequences. Groups of rights operate in relation 
to one another. Change the rules regarding economic freedom, and this will 
echo into the law of parental custody and control. Understanding both how 
severable, but also how interdependent, the myriad facets of adulthood are 
can be vital to assessing deviations from the bright-line division between 
childhood and adulthood.  
The form and structure of emerging adult laws, whether there are steps 
to adulthood, a bright line, or something else, can be judged against the three 
guiding principles presented above. Law should be flexible to accommodate 
the transitional nature of emerging adulthood. To that end, raising the age 
of majority across the board would not ultimately serve this age group. 
However, lawmakers should also be cognizant of tension between 
autonomy and dependency that runs through many areas of law, so by 
moving one threshold age there can be ripple effects across other areas of 
law. With that in mind, I propose a set of options that focus on transitioning, 
learning, and developing relationships across different legal arenas.  
C. Expanding the Toolkit 
Rather than adopt either a bright-line rule or a set of thresholds, I propose 
an alternative approach. Returning to the principles of economic 
dependence, connected autonomy, and learning from mistakes helps sort out 
what types of laws would be most responsive to the emerging adult 
experience. With that in mind, the following array of options for legal 
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design emphasizes flexibility, mentorship or opportunities for learning, and 
softening the sharp lines between dependency and autonomy.  
These options are not meant to replace threshold rules in all cases; there 
are some instances where the interest in having a clear, universal rule 
outweighs all other considerations. The equality and democracy interests in 
having a uniform voting age, especially given the United States’ appalling 
history of using “literacy” tests as a way to disenfranchise African American 
voters, likely outweigh the benefits of a more nuanced system for allocating 
voting rights.146 Rather, these proposals encourage creativity and innovation 
in the development of new laws that are more compatible with the 
experience of emerging adulthood than the traditional legal categories 
provide. 
There are many variations on this theme. One option is for the law to 
condition certain rights and responsibilities on completion of a training 
course or after passing an exam. Driver’s licenses provide a template from 
the law of adolescence for how there might be tiers (learner’s permit, driving 
test, young driver license, regular adult license) that are associated with age, 
but are not automatically attained at a certain age. This approach could be 
deployed to help emerging adults develop supportive relationships by 
requiring that the emerging adult seek advice or counseling from another 
adult. For instance, laws could predicate access to other rights and 
responsibilities on completion of a training or mentorship program—for 
instance as a necessary precondition to obtaining a gun license or a drinking 
license.  
If the liberties of adulthood are conditioned on completing some form of 
training, then the state must be sure that all young people have equal access 
to the training and tools they need to meet the requirements of obtaining the 
license or permit. It would run counter to the goals of this project if such 
programs further exacerbated inequality by rewarding young people who 
could pay for private lessons or programs to attain benefits earlier than those 
who do not have access.  
Law could also provide incentives for emerging adults to engage in 
certain desirable processes. For example, Texas offers a program where the 
waiting period for a marriage license and the fee are reduced if the couple 
participates in a premarital counseling program.147 Such a program might 
work for emerging adults as a condition on opening a credit card or 
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exceeding a certain debt level. Incentive-based programs could also give 
state funded financial support for higher education that requires regular 
check-ins with a counselor rather than outcome-based criteria, such as GPA. 
Law can support emerging adults by offering alternatives to the parent-
child model and its binary of either care and control or formal autonomy. 
Existing proposals directed toward young people who cannot rely on the 
parent-child model provide a guide to broader reforms. Bruce Boyer’s 
proposal, for example, which would allow youth aging out of foster care to 
experiment with “trial independence,” is a notion that might apply in 
broader contexts.148 Jordan Blair Woods’s critique of child welfare systems 
that attempt to recreate the parent-child model for older unaccompanied 
youth suggests instead a system of support, skills, and resources that 
promote self-reliance that could be expanded outward.149  
Another area of law that could provide inspiration for emerging adult 
support systems beyond the parent-child model is mental health law. In the 
mental health field, the default for many years was a 
guardianship/dependency model in which individuals with certain 
impairments lost their decisional autonomy and were placed under the care 
of a designated adult (this remains true in many places and contexts). 150  
The field of mental health law has recently begun to recognize the value 
of a support system that is not defined by a guardian-dependent dyad, but 
by a more open network.151 Advocates and scholars have proposed reforms 
that permit individuals under this legal regime to make their own life 
choices. A central element of this reform is to introduce “supported decision 
making” (SDM) into law as an alternative to full guardianship. 
The concept of SDM rests on the idea that people do not make large life 
decisions alone. Proponents of the model contend that even those with 
serious mental health barriers can have some agency over their own lives, 
if given the proper support from others.152 The supported decision-making 
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model incorporates many of the same aims that are relevant to developing a 
connected autonomy model for emerging adults. Namely, that even when 
there are developmental or cognitive capacity obstacles to making healthy 
decisions that further one’s long-term wellbeing, a person can have some 
control over their lives when given the appropriate level of guidance and 
help. This kind of guidance can be incorporated into law in situations in 
which a person’s capacity to make decisions for themself is called into 
question. 
Community and social institutions can also serve as powerful conduits 
for implementing and enforcing the laws of emerging adulthood. Today, 
many civic and public institutions no longer serve the same functions for 
the same populations that they once did. 153  College is still a robust 
institution, although many young people are excluded, and the model for 
higher education is moving away from the all-encompassing institution 
embodied in the small liberal arts college. A crucial focus of the new law of 
emerging adults should be on bolstering new and existing institutions that 
serve as bridges to adulthood. Rather than relying on the vastly unequal 
distribution of institutional support provided to emerging adults under a 
private model, community institutions could find new centrality in young 
people’s lives. In addition to being sites to implement consultation or 
training-based programs, community colleges and other community support 
centers could filter emerging adults’ access to third parties and provide 
collective advocacy.154 
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
A. Conditions for Change 
What would it take to transform emerging adulthood in law? In order to 
understand what might happen with age laws in the future, it is helpful to 
look to the past. Historical experience illustrates what can happen when age 
laws become too divergent from each other, or from lived experience. 
Although each era has its own set of political and social forces that shape 
the direction of law, the rapid and far-reaching shift in the age of majority 
that took place over the second half of the twentieth century can provide 
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insight into the relevant actors and conditions that shape emerging adult law 
in the twenty-first century.  
In response to the need for soldiers in the Second World War, Congress 
amended the Selective Service Act, lowering the age at which young men 
needed to sign up for military service to eighteen. 155 Prior to that point, the 
age for military duty tended to correspond to the age of majority, which was 
usually twenty-one.156 Many people at the time assumed that the age to fight 
and vote should be the same, given the longstanding link between “the 
citizen and the soldier.”157 Nevertheless, despite opposition, throughout the 
mid-twentieth century, “old enough to fight” was not “old enough to 
vote.”158 
It was not until the Vietnam War that protestors mobilized against the 
mismatch between the draft age and the age of majority. Youth 
empowerment advocates pointed out the evident unfairness of being called 
up to fight and die before you could vote. The “Vote 18” movement gained 
considerable momentum after 1968 and, like enfranchisement movements 
before it, culminated in a constitutional amendment. Historian Rebecca de 
Schweinitz describes it in optimistic terms:  
Vote 18 reflected the rising significance of eighteen as a turning point 
in young people’s lives, the successful expansion of universal 
secondary education, increasingly positive perceptions of young 
people and their role in the modern world, and the meaningful 
activism of youth on the nation’s most pressing issues.159 
An alternative reading of this period suggests, however, that the effort to 
placate youth anger by lowering the voting age was a political calculation 
designed to diffuse tension and avoid a potentially much more radical set of 
demands.160  
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified on July 5, 1971 161  and 
declared that: “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
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years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of age.”162  
The next chapter in the story, then, is somewhat puzzling. Without much 
fanfare, states altered the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen (or 
nineteen in some states). 163 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment did not require 
such a change, but the rapid and sweeping transformation in state law 
suggests that lawmakers drew a direct line between the federal voting age 
and the age of majority. In response to the historical events of the mid-
twentieth century, in most states today, there is a strong default position of 
eighteen as the age of majority. Connecticut’s law is illustrative:  
Except as otherwise provided by statute, on and after October 1, 
1972, the terms “minor”, “infant” and “infancy” shall be deemed to 
refer to a person under the age of eighteen years and any person 
eighteen years of age or over shall be an adult for all purposes 
whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, 
privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities as persons heretofore 
had at twenty-one years of age, and “age of majority” shall be deemed 
to be eighteen years. 164  
This quick shift, however, raised some difficult questions about who 
counted as an adult and what “adulthood” entailed within the law. Had 
twenty-year-olds in 1969 been less “adult” than their younger siblings who 
turned twenty in 1973? Under the law, yes—even if social understanding of 
age did not transform so quickly. To simplify a complex history, what did 
the fact that President Roosevelt needed young bodies to fight Nazis in 1942 
have to do with the capacity of a college student to sign a car loan in 1972?  
The next national development in age law highlighted the tension 
between the new age of majority and society’s understandings about youth. 
As states began to lower the age of majority, many also lowered the legal 
drinking age from twenty-one to eighteen or nineteen. The staggered nature 
of these changes lead to a phenomenon, which became known as “blood 
borders”: young people would drive from a state with a higher drinking age 
across the border to a lower age state, drink, drive home and get into fatal 
accidents.165 In response, Congress passed the Federal Minimum Drinking 
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Age as part of its 1984 amendments to the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act.166  The Act conditioned federal highway funds on states 
changing their drinking age (in many cases, back) to twenty-one. The 
debates over setting the drinking age focused both on the need for 
consistency and on why twenty-one was a better age. Advocates cited to 
statistics about driving fatalities caused by young drivers, as well as the fact 
that the victims tended to be of a similar age.167 Those in favor of the 
minimum drinking age frequently referred to eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-
olds as “children.”168  
The result was a general agglomeration of rights and responsibilities of 
adulthood at eighteen, but with express exceptions. Some states entrenched 
this combination of thresholds in the state constitution, as was done in 
Montana:  
A person 18 years of age or older is an adult for all purposes, except 
that the legislature or the people by initiative may establish the legal 
age for purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcoholic beverages.169  
What lessons can advocates for emerging adults learn from history? 
First, that a sustained effort by youth-driven social movements can 
significantly shift the legal baseline. Today social movements focused on 
gun control, student debt, police violence, and climate change all have 
strong youth leadership.170 Whether these groups will coalesce around a 
shared set of goals, and how much influence they will have on state or 
federal (or international) politics remains to be seen. However, the attention 
these movements have received in the media and popular culture suggest 
that they might be a significant force for change moving forward. 
Another lesson from past experience is that law can be vulnerable to 
change when it diverges too far from social expectations. In the 1960s and 
70s, the incongruity between sending young men to fight in Vietnam before 
they could legally vote was met with resistance. Today, the exorbitant cost 
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of education or the punitive nature of criminal justice might lead to similar 
resistance.  
The story of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, however, is also a cautionary 
tale. By the time this period of legal transformation had ended, age laws 
were not much more coherent than they had been before. Instead, changing 
the voting age to eighteen set off a cascade of changes, which were 
untethered from the original rationale for shifting the threshold age. Social 
movements and legal reformers today would do well to keep in mind the 
interconnected elements of age law and be aware of how shifting the law in 
one area might have unintended consequences elsewhere.  
B. Obstacles 
Even if the conditions are right for widespread reform to the law of 
emerging adults, there are a number of obstacles that could impede or 
foreclose change. In some cases, existing law may not permit singling out 
emerging adults for different treatment. In South Carolina, for instance, the 
consequences of a constitutional age of majority arose in a controversy over 
age restrictions for gun sales. The South Carolina Constitution provides 
that: 
Every citizen who is eighteen years of age or older, not laboring 
under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise 
established by law, shall be deemed sui juris and endowed with full 
legal rights and responsibilities, provided, that the General Assembly 
may restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons until age 
twenty-one.171  
In 2008, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a law restricting 
gun sales for individuals under twenty-one violated the state constitution.172 
The court concluded that alcohol sales was the only exception permitted, 
and any additions would infringe on the “full legal rights and 
responsibilities” of adulthood.173  
Although cases like that of the South Carolina Constitution arise only 
rarely, it is not out of the question that opponents to emerging adult laws 
 
171. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 14 (emphasis added).  
172. State v. Bolin, 662 S.E.2d 38, 39–40 (S.C. 2008). In this case, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court held, in a brief judgment, without much further explanation, that:  
[b]y expressly allowing the regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages to the 18– to 20–year–
old age group and not stating any other situation in which the General Assembly may restrict 
the rights of this age group, the state constitution precludes the General Assembly from 
prohibiting this age group’s possession of handguns. 
Id. at 40.  












could raise Equal Protection or other substantive objections. In the drinking 
age context, claims that the law unconstitutionally discriminates based on 
age have not been successful.174 Although generally courts have avoided 
striking down age-based classifications, when fundamental rights are at 
play—for instance the Second Amendment or the Substantive Due Process 
rights relating to family—there could be colorable claims that drawing lines 
above the age of majority is arbitrary.175  
The absence of constitutional guidance on age laws, however, does not 
erase normative liberty and equality concerns. Alexander Boni-Saenz’s 
work on age discrimination presents a range of normative objections to 
using age as a legal category.176 Included among these is a liberty-based 
argument against using age law to dictate or channel a person’s life course. 
He notes that the libertarian model counsels that “the pathways that one 
might take in pursuit of one’s life goals should not be dictated by age, and 
certain opportunities should not be foreclosed solely because of age.”177 
However, he also notes that some age laws might be permissible—namely 
those related to developing maturity that are designed to protect the 
individual’s future liberty by protecting them from the full consequences of 
immature choices. 178  The liberty-based model provides an important 
limiting principle in response to the critique that a new law of emerging 
adults could be unjustifiably paternalistic. In crafting a new law of emerging 
adults, lawmakers should ask whether the laws are supporting the future 
adult’s life choices or are instead dictating a particular life course regardless 
of the individual’s goals and interests.  
Historically, the American experience with protective legislation for 
specific groups—namely women—gives rise to additional concerns about a 
protective approach to emerging adulthood. During the so-called “Lochner” 
era, courts were more amenable to upholding protective legislation 
regulating women’s work. 179  Women, under this view, were more 
vulnerable than men (both physically and mentally) and should not be 
 
174. See Gabree v. King, 614 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying rational basis scrutiny to uphold 
a Massachusetts law that set the drinking age above the age of majority).  
175. See Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a 
Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 215 (2010) (“For decades, both the legal academy 
and the courts have assumed that—unlike classifications based on race or gender—classifications based 
on age do not offend constitutional equal protection guarantees. Consistent with this assumption, 
chronological age is seen as an expedient and acceptable proxy for a variety of underlying human 
characteristics that policymakers wish to target for public policy interventions, and age-based criteria 
continue to be entrenched in U.S. public policy.”). 
176. Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Time, and Discrimination, 53 GA. L. REV. 845 (2019). 
177. Id. at 894. 
178. Id. at 899. 
179. See Julie Novkov, Liberty, Protection, and Women’s Work: Investigating the Boundaries 
Between Public and Private, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 857, 860–61 (1996) (compiling case law from 
the Progressive era).  











subjected to working conditions that prevented them from engaging in their 
higher social purpose, namely motherhood.180  
Some women’s groups at the time, as well as later feminists, challenged 
the paternalist justifications for the women’s labor laws.181 Rather than give 
women more power in the labor market, they argued, these laws would 
instead exclude women by making it far more likely for employers to favor 
men, whose labor they could exploit without fear of state interference. Other 
groups viewed the protective legislation as a necessary reflection on the 
social reality of poor and working-class women’s position.  
In many ways, the proposals in this Article that treat emerging adults 
differently mirror the Progressive’s arguments in favor of protective 
legislation for women. They rest on claims that emerging adults are 
developmentally and mentally different from older adults in ways that make 
them vulnerable to risky choices and exploitation. Emerging adults have 
less bargaining power in the market since they lack work experience, 
training, and often remain dependent on financial support from others. 
Emerging adults have a vital role for the broader society—they are learning 
how to be citizens, workers, and responsible, independent members of the 
community—a transformation that does not occur overnight. Some of the 
same concerns feminists have raised for over a century about women’s 
protective legislation apply here, too. Would restricting market autonomy 
exclude emerging adults from opportunities that are currently available to 
them?  
Emerging adults as a group, however, differ from women as a group in 
important ways that have implications for any critique of singling them out 
for special protections. Emerging adulthood is a temporary state, through 
which anyone who lives to adulthood must pass. In that way, unlike gender, 
age is both universal and transitory. Every adult was once nineteen, but no 
one stays nineteen forever. Second, the evidence of difference between 
emerging adults and older adults is far more robust and less embedded in 
 
180. See Claudio J. Katz, Protective Labor Legislation in the Courts: Substantive Due Process 
and Fairness in the Progressive Era, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 275, 308 (2013) (describing how the courts 
in the 1910s moved away from the prevailing view that “women could legitimately be singled out only 
because they were the weaker sex, physically incapable of holding their own in competition with men, 
and because the state had a public interest in protecting their maternal role”); David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1960, 1963 (2003) (describing the attitude of courts 
toward protective legislation for women in the late 1800s). 
181. See Melissa Murray, Symposium Foreword, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Century in the 
Making, 43 HARBINGER 91, 93 (2019) (“Working-class women favored protective labor laws . . . . such 
legislation was a practical—and necessary—response to the very real dangers of economic (and other 
forms of) exploitation that women faced when they left their homes to participate in the workplace. . . . 
For [] economically privileged women, protective legislation, and the Court’s defense of such laws, was 
rooted in gendered stereotypes that harmed women, even as they purported to help them.”); Bernstein, 
supra note 180, at 1965 (“[C]ontrasting views regarding women’s rights and abilities were already 












deeply rooted stereotypes than was the support for protecting women 
workers in the nineteenth century. 182  Unlike protective legislation that 
barred women from certain forms of work, the objective of protective rules 
for emerging adults should be to preserve the individual’s capacity to 
engage in public life in the future, not to permanently exclude them from it. 
Nevertheless, historical experience provides a helpful caution against 
relying too heavily on generalizations about a particular group’s needs or 
experiences. Creating fair and effective laws for emerging adults must also 
address the diverse nature of the population being regulated. Some 
individuals spend their emerging adult years in prison, some are parenting 
young children or caring for elderly family members, others are in 
residential treatment centers for substance abuse, attaining a slew of elite 
degrees, working in construction, or traveling the world searching for 
purpose. In many ways, the range of choices that a person has on their 
eighteenth birthday for how to spend the next year or decade of her life has 
already been set by the conditions of her childhood and factors determined 
far before she could make any autonomous choices about her life course. 183 
Even using the term “emerging adulthood” assumes that the individual 
has not become “fully” adult, but that she might someday become one. This 
is surely not the case for every person, even if they pass through this 
chronological age. It would be a reasonable worry to think that focusing on 
emerging adulthood might exclude those who do not fit the paradigm of a 
“normal” or “typical” emerging adult, further burdening people who are 
likely to already be members of marginalized groups. It would be easy to 
perpetuate in law the problem that some scholars have raised about the 
psychology of emerging adulthood—that the paradigmatic example of an 
emerging adult is a white, middle class, able bodied, college-bound, young 
person who has not experienced any substantial trauma nor has he many 
responsibilities aside from pursuing his own interests and ambitions.  
Some of the seemingly desirable outcomes of interventions into 
emerging adulthood, such as giving people the space to explore identity, 
engage in higher education, and prepare for leadership in the knowledge 
economy, could easily be seen as preparing young people for a life many of 
them will never have. Deep contemplation about one’s values, and about 
one’s relationship to others and to the world, is a luxury. Perhaps, for some, 
being treated as fully adult as early as possible is the most realistic approach 
given that their range of life options have been effectively narrowed during 
childhood. For some, the notion of emerging adulthood as described by 
 
182. See supra note 180.  
183. For more on how the legal regulation of family structures permits or impedes resiliency, see 
CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014).  











Arnett and others might be infantilizing, culturally insulting, or excessively 
focused on the individual, rather than on the community or family unit.  
Lawmakers who are committed to crafting a new law of emerging adults 
must be sensitive to the context in which they work. Any attempt to classify 
individuals is bound to be over- and/or under-inclusive, but there are ways 
that could help minimize the likelihood that intervention into this area will 
only serve to exacerbate existing inequalities. One is to emphasize, as I do 
in this Article, that reformers should focus on flexible, community-based 
approaches that are oriented toward serving a range of needs. While one 
young person might require support in navigating the financial and social 
implications of leaving college, another might need support planning for 
entering the workforce once her child is enrolled in daycare. Whatever the 
individual case, young people can take advantage of community support to 
help with the transition from legal dependency into formal autonomy. The 
proposed law of emerging adults, therefore, should focus on processes for 
helping to connect young people to financial support, adult mentorship, and 
opportunities for reflective decision-making. The aim, at its core, should be 
to ensure that emerging adults are able to enjoy the benefits of this 
transitional period of life and are supported during the substantial social, 
psychological, and economic challenges that arise during these years.  
CONCLUSION 
A law of emerging adults is emerging. How this new set of laws will 
regulate the transitional years between adolescence and adulthood remains 
to be seen. Just as the concept of adolescence transformed legal expectations 
in the twentieth century, emerging adulthood is poised to do so in the 
twenty-first century. Widespread legal change requires a clear 
understanding of emerging adults’ lived experience. It also requires a set of 
guiding normative principles to shape the content and structure of the law. 
This Article offers a path forward: one which acknowledges the tension 
between the dependency and autonomy, responsibility and inexperience, 
which characterizes this life stage.  
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